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Taxation of the Financial Sector: 
Robin Hood Taxes and Regulatory Framework 
Abstract. The so-called bank levy–a tax levied on bank leverage–has been proliferated to date. They are the 
product of reacting to the global fi nancial crisis that started in the autumn of 2008. Therefore, they can only be 
understood in the context of the crisis. Since one or two decades, the fi nancial industry has produced much 
innovation that is to be refl ected in taxation. The application of bank levy is thus the result of the reforms initiated 
in the sphere of fi nancial regulation rather than tax law. Financial and tax laws are different from each other in 
many respects, however, as it will be discussed below where the constitutional background for the introduction of 
fi nancial taxes will be explored. 
Keywords: bank leverage taxation, Robin Hood taxes, ex ante and ex post measures 
In this paper, bank levies; one of the newly introduced fi nancial taxes–are in the centre of 
interest. In this respect, the paper concerns 
– policy options and regulatory framework; 
– detailed policy matters; and 
– justifi cation issues. 
More precisely, it is discussed below:
– why and how was it necessary, following the global fi nancial crisis, to introduce a 
bank levy and other new means of taxation in the fi nancial sector; 
– how much is ethics relevant to the conduct of the participants of fi nancial markets, 
and what about the imbalances of virtualised fi nancial markets; 
– how can the meaning of the particular legal techniques be revealed that are applicable 
to the fi nancial sector as para fi scal charges (corrective taxes to be adjusted to the envisaged 
externalities, or steering duties as compared to the non-tax tools of social control); 
– how can the commercialisation of morality be refl ected in the special fi nancial taxes 
as Robin Hood ones; 
– what is the regulatory framework for bank leverage taxation; 
– what are the regulatory policy issues in detail, in particular, how can excessive 
fi nance be identifi ed for tax purposes; 
– how can a bank levy be justifi ed as a product of innovation in tax law, in particular, 
what about tax incidence, the constitutional background, the issues of debt bias and double 
charging; and 
– how is it possible (or is it possible any way) to reconcile the contrasting views on 
fi nancial taxes of the business community, represented by tax lawyers, on the one hand, and 
the critics of macro economics, on the other one. 
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1. Post-crisis regulatory design 
(i) Tackling volatility, opacity and illiquidity 
The initiatives to be discussed in this paper to introduce new taxes in the fi nancial industry 
are a by-product of the global fi nancial crisis that has been apparent in the autumn of 2008. 
The crisis is due to fi nancial innovations that have been designed to intensify fi nancial 
activity. The result of it has been fi nancial hyperactivity. This is what has been considered 
to date as a matter of externalities. They suggest diffi culties that have been associated with 
the increase in the fi nancial markets of systemic risks. The new taxes are precisely designed 
to address these externalities. Innovations of the fi nancial market have been followed by 
innovations, now appearing in tax design. 
The global fi nancial crisis can be characterised by the features of refl exivity, virtuality 
and self-generation. According to George Soros, the economy that has underwent the 
current crisis can be characterised1 by the following features: 
(i) The crisis economy is refl exive in the sense that fi nancial market prices affect 
through bubbles the fundamentals that are supposed to be refl ected in the market prices 
themselves. 
(ii) It has produced new layers of reality as substantive economic claims have been all 
the more monetized and securitised. This is to virtualise the real economy. For instance, 
new generations of securities appear, based on the restructuring of fi nancial claims through 
intermediaries like special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”). They are not really supported by 
fresh capital. They are only the result of holding tranches of restructured claims that are 
used as a security for the issue of a new generation of securities. New fi nancial products do 
not derive from additional savings. Yet, they are able to produce increase in capital, even if 
the capital created this way represents novelty in accounting terms only. 
(iii) The crisis economy is of self-generating nature, that is, autopoietic, because 
capital markets, producing a variety of composite and derivative fi nancial products, are able 
to operate according to the rules they have developed themselves like in the world of 
cybernetics. As a result of the new layers of reality, fi nancial markets are able to generate 
themselves from scratch. Self-generation has meant the development of investment projects 
that have proven to be bubbles. Then, the infl ated market can collapse inadvertently. 
The global fi nancial crisis requires special legal and policy measures to deal with the 
problems arising from the crisis. The crisis suggests refl exivity in measuring the 
performance of fi nancial and real economies, the amplifi cation of the schemes arising from 
the restructuring of fi nancial claims, and self-generation of investment schemes. It also 
constitutes a framework, within which the scope of taxation can be demarcated. 
The new taxes are addressed to the externalities arising from the above-mentioned 
features: 
(i) They are designed to alleviate fi nancial market movements. In particular, it can be 
hoped that the introduction of new taxes will be able to mitigate price volatility, making the 
formation of prices more realistic. 
1 Soros, G.: The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What it 
Means. PublicAffairs, New York, 2008. 
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(ii) Investors are less protected in the instance that the fi nancial environment becomes 
opaque due to the artifi cial creation of capital, and to the discrepancy that can be experienced 
in the indicators of the various tranches of newly created capital. The new taxes that are 
aimed at the components of assets, liabilities, activities, or at transactions that are tainted by 
fi nancial hyper-activity could be helpful with removing these anomalies. 
(iii) New taxes are to be introduced, following the failed expectation that fi nancial 
markets tend to equilibrium. These taxes could be able to break the process of fi nancial 
self-generation through bubbles. They can thus be helpful with de- and reconstructing 
fi nancial markets. 
According to the criticism of the crisis economy, it has been illusory to assume that 
– trade with high frequency would have contributed to more effi cient price formation; 
– fi nancial innovation would have made fi nancial markets more complete, and 
improved transparency in the management and distribution of risks; and 
– fi nancial hyperactivity would have ensued more liquidity.2 
From this perspective, the introduction of the tax related tools of fi nancial regulation 
would not really be a technical problem. Arguably, it is rather a matter of political decision 
to decide in favour of such taxes.3 A fi nancial transaction tax is technically feasible, and 
morally right.4 
Without getting engaged in dispute with the above criticism, it should be clear from 
the present paper that it is unfortunately not only a matter of good intentions to solicit the 
introduction of special taxes applicable to the fi nancial sector. As they are expected to be 
fl exible due to the changing economic environment, they inadvertently lead to legal 
uncertainty. From the perspective of legality, it is thus not obvious at all how the new taxes 
can be put in place. 
(ii)  Relevance of ethics to the individual conduct of fi nancial managers 
and to the systemic operation of fi nancial markets 
The application to the conduct of fi nancial managers of ethical considerations seems to be 
diffi cult. At a glance, individual bankers cannot be blamed that they would be engaged in 
fraudulent schemes or would deceive their clients by overestimation, violating the standards 
of sobriety, while seeking to maximise shareholder value. It is their duty to act on behalf of 
their clients, seeking their benefi t. Restructuring of fi nancial claims is rational because by 
means of such activity it is possible to enhance values that were hidden before. The system 
of excessive fi nance may nevertheless tend to go wrong. 
The ethical standard of fair valuation does not seem to be broken upon restructuring of 
fi nancial claims, producing CDOs (collateral debt obligations), yet securitisation may result 
in volatility in prices, opacity in operation, and illiquidity upon exit. Carrying out individual 
fi nancial transactions may be ethically unobjectionable even if the system towards which 
individual actions tend goes wrong. It is then a matter of ethical responsibility to stop 
functioning of such a system once it has proved wrong. 
2 Schäfer, D.: Financial Transaction Tax Contributes to more Sustainability in Financial 
Markets. Intereconomics, (2012) 2, 76. 
3 Schulmeister, S.: A general fi nancial transactions tax: Strong pros, weak cons. Intereconomics, 
(2012) 2, 89. 
4  Buckley, R. P.: A fi nancial transaction tax: The one essential reform. Intereconomics, (2012) 
2, 103. 
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Opportunism of market behaviour may be revealed individually, in group, or even by 
large organisations, including public bodies. Human motivation may still exceed pure 
market calculations.  Great business should survive in the long run, and is based on the idea 
that a good contract serves the balance of interests with all contracting parties. Being 
subject to positional goods, the use of which is exclusive, and to economic rewards that are 
to be granted under the strict equivalence principle of “do ut des” represent the human 
constraints on the market behaviour. Disregard of these constraints is certainly unethical. It 
is not yet easy to identify them in the daily course of business. 
From a moral point of view, the individual market player cannot be criticised where he 
or she complies with the professional standards in conformity with the operation of free 
competition.  The starting point for moral responsibility is for the market player that he or 
she should be aware of the human constraints on the operation of markets. Then, the market 
behaviour must be adjusted (completing the profi t motive by the idea of the economic, 
social and ecological balance of households, by seeking to go beyond the scope of market 
opportunism, etc.). 
A good example for the diffi culty one has to come across, while calling into account 
ethical requirements in the business life is tax avoidance. This is the abuse of law. However, 
no single legal provisions are violated in this case. Neither are here professional standards 
disregarded. It is then more than diffi cult to raise ethical issues. Ethics represents meta-
juridical values, the enforcement by legal means of which would be dysfunctional. 
In the process of the application of law, formal rationality cannot be dispensed with. 
This means that the individual conduct can only be evaluated to the extent that it is 
imputable to the social command as negotiated by legal norms. Then, it is possible to 
conclude whether the conduct under discussion does or does not comply with law. 
Unfortunately, law refl ects its own contradiction to the extent that it is unable to manage the 
problems arising from the conduct, which does not break a particular legal rule, but which 
perverts the system of legal rules as a whole. It comes from this that tax avoidance can be 
approached by means of non-law only that makes an avenue to ethics. Yet, law as a system 
resists the evaluation of the individual conduct by means of other than law. 
The respect of moral values is presupposed by the choice between the values of good 
and evil from the perspective of morality. Big organisations survive thanks to more formal 
rules. Furthermore, the state–operating in the centre of offi cial life–is in a position of 
introducing laws. As markets are only subject to laws and to professional rules of conduct, 
the simple operation of markets does not raise the question of morality.5 The choice of 
moral values is possible if market participants elevate themselves over their interests that 
are rooted in rude market positions. Observation of the standards of good faith and due 
diligence does not yet mean ethical choice, the precondition of which would be to go 
beyond the scope of a market decisions, exercising criticism if necessary over the market 
oriented conduct. An example for this is investing in ethical or ecological funds. Such a 
decision goes far beyond the standards of due diligence. 
The lesson that can be drawn from the global fi nancial crisis is that the assumption that 
individual actions of the participants of fi nancial markets tend to result in an optimal state 
of markets has not proven true. The reason for this is that seeking for shareholder-value has 
become the end instead of serving as a means of controlling the performance of the 
5 Koslowski, P.: The Ethics of Banking; Conclusions from the Financial Crisis. Springer 
Science+Business Media B.V. 2011, Chapter 3: The ethical economy of the capital market. 36. 
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company that operates for the benefi t of its stakeholders. Financial service-providers are 
expected to serve their customer, eventually arising from the real economy, who should not 
seek to maximise, but to generate profi t. 
In a market economy, it is crucial to achieve compatibility between managers and 
shareholders. At the level of owners and employees (fi nis operantis), maximisation of utility 
is acceptable. At the level of the company itself, good products are expected to provide to 
the consumer (fi nis operis). This means effi ciency and effectiveness in the supply of goods 
and services. Compatibility between the two factors makes it possible that the invisible 
hand of the market is working, at least from case to case.6 
Where there is no balance between fi nancial and real economy, there is no interaction 
either between the functions of serving the consumer and the profi t motive. As a result, the 
invisible hand of market fails to operate. Where fi nancial markets make themselves 
independent of the real economy, admitting to enjoy rewards that deviate from the rewards 
available in the rest of the economy, the state must intervene by means of taxation to restore 
the balance between fi nancial and real economy, and to reinstitute equality in taxation.7 
(iii) Imbalances of virtualised fi nancial markets 
Excessive fi nance may lose its functionality. One can still hardly predict the time when the 
borderline of ethically acceptable values is transgressed. Financial speculation cannot be 
condemned as such. It can cause harm to communities, however. It can only be recognised 
from time to time whether participation in certain transactions can be ethically tenable or 
not, and if so, in what conditions. 
Banking credit results in granting a loan to business or consumer households, usually 
as deposit money. That is, the debtor does not use cash to meet obligations, but transfers his 
or her claims arising from the banking credit received. As money is a soft product of 
economy, based on mutual trust, the scope of banking credit can be extended to ethical 
lending. Technically, it is without any serious diffi culty to switch over from instrumental 
rationality to reciprocity in the process of consolidating money as a means of payment. 
Insofar as money is a means of social convention, the law related aspect of money is of 
striking importance (as comparable to the commodity based side of the social use of 
money). 
It is not precluded that money serves broader goals than just the maximisation of 
individual profi t. Money would then be able to meet the need of the stakeholders, broadly 
speaking, arising from need of the poor, or from the necessity that ecological projects must 
be fi nanced. Money is considered in this respect as a means of the responsible allocation of 
social resources. A loan a bank may grant can be extended to other than the strict calculation 
of profi t because the lender’s profi ts should consist not only of unilateral economic benefi ts, 
but also of the needs of the social environment, and of the contribution to social and 
ecological welfare.8 
As the lending policy of easy money signifi cantly contributed to the fi nancial crisis 
starting in the autumn of 2008, fi nancial and tax regulations have to discipline banks that 
6 Ibid. Chapter 10 Financial Overstretch: The Epochal Disturbance of the Invisible Hand of the 
Market by the Financial Industry. 147. 
7 Ibid. Chapter 10 Financial Overstretch: The Epochal Disturbance of the Invisible Hand of the 
Market by the Financial Industry. 151. 
8 Ibid. Chapter 2: The ethical economy of the credit market. 29. 
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felt to be compelled by competition to loosen their credit policy standards. It seems to be 
even more problematic that a large number of people accepted a loan of mortgage for 
second or third homes. They did not really borrow because they would have needed credit. 
They simply did it because the credit available was cheap. Hence, banks can be called into 
account for their negligence. Their customers can be reproached even more for the 
covetousness and materialism they showed. They fell prey to their naive belief in laws of 
the market economy. Such a conduct may be disciplined, or even reprimanded, not to 
mention that a large number of them lost the property they obtained through a discounted 
loan. It seems to be reasonable to hit by legal or tax regulations such behaviour of both 
lenders and borrowers. 
The policy of easy money leads to the confusion with customers of what is needed 
with what is cheap. They make a mistake because they orient themselves according to the 
instrumental rationality of market economy even where it would be required to come back 
to the basic function economy, aimed at achieving balance between their needs and the 
sources that are scarcely available. Under the policy of easy money, fi nancial service-
providers produce extraordinary cases, from which they can benefi t, and even their 
customers seem to benefi t. The process of creating easy money is not endless, however. 
The expansion of fi nancial markets could not be stopped due to the hyper incentivising 
of bank managers and, more importantly, for lack of the effective constraint of market 
demand on the performance of fi nancial markets. The creation of deposit money through 
lending can only be constrained by competition of banks with each other and, fi nally, by the 
restricted performance of the real economy. Virtualisation of the functioning of fi nancial 
markets has loosened the constraint of demand, eventually to be determined by the real 
economy’s capacities. This also means isolation from the trends of real economy. 
The erosion of the constraint of market demand has started already through the 
collectivisation of capital, the arising socialising function of fi nance capital,9 and the 
emergence of the “technostructure”10 when the managers had the company get interested in 
expanding the size of their business rather than in maximising its profi t. In the circumstances 
of the concentration of capital and de-concentration of ownership, the special skills of 
managers have deeply been integrated into the process of business administration. This 
happened in developed countries already at the turn 19th and 20th century. When the 
“technostructure” makes corporate owners interested in increasing their business in size, 
economic expansion suggests the increase of business in size that results in turn in 
increasing the power that can be exercised over the growing business. This process of 
growth can only be stopped when the scarcely available natural resources are depleted. The 
barrier of market demand does not play here a key role. Although managerial capitalism 
and technostructure declined in the 1980s, the constraint of demand has not been toughened 
in the fi nancial markets that started working globally. 
Virtualisation of fi nancial markets taking place through the creation of capital in the 
process of restructuring of fi nancial claims and securitisation through SPVs has ensued that 
the constraints of market demand have been elusive. The participants of fi nancial markets 
have been driven away by the illusion that there are no constraints on the creation of money, 
and that the real economy should automatically react to the creation of additional deposit 
money by catching up with it, increasing production. The global fi nancial crisis has divulged 
9 Hilferding, R.: Finanzkapital. Wien, 1947. 514. 
10 Galbraith, J. K.: The new industrial state. Boston, 1967. 71.
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imbalances between fi nancial and real economy markets. Hyper-capitalism has transformed 
itself into its own opposite: capitalist economy has been developed where capital can be 
created without raising additional funds from the real economy. The mirage of fi nancial 
innovation has yet been over. As this happened while causing signifi cant harm to the society, 
the state should intervene by means of follow-up fi nancial regulation and taxation. 
In the circumstances of virtualised fi nancial markets, the process of creating easy 
money seems to be endless. It will be stopped, however, if it reaches a psychological barrier, 
that is, public trust ends. Then, the economic and social environment ceases to meet the 
expectation that the newly created money would be offset by the additional performance of 
real economy. This is the time when bubbles burst out. 
The economy where economic survival does not depend on the barrier of market 
demand, but on the barrier of trust cannot be considered capitalistic. In this instance, 
capitalism turns into non-capitalism where power arises from the exploitation of the 
monopoly of the special skills of fi nancial managers. As their power is not established on 
private property, but on the monopolisation of special skills, they also constitute a type of 
“technostructure”. 
In a capitalist economy, there is a balance of prices with the respective exchange 
values.  The use of private property makes it possible to exploit the worker, expropriating 
part of the value he or she has produced. This is the surplus value (“Mehrwert” with Marx), 
which is no longer necessary to reproduce his or her skills. In virtualised fi nancial markets, 
there are fi nancial managers who hold the power of monopolising their skills. In extra 
circumstances, they can achieve extra rewards. This can only take place for lack of the 
balance of prices with the respective exchange values. Furthermore, fi nancial market 
participants pretend to create new values. This is phantasm, however. They add mock value 
to the economy through the creation of additional money. This will not turn out, however, 
as long as the bubbles developed will not burst out. 
Like in the economy subject to the power of technostructure, the economy of 
virtualised fi nancial markets cannot be considered to be capitalistic either. The reason for 
this is that the laws of capitalist speculation are so much intensifi ed that they convert 
themselves into non-capitalism. This is a process where capitalism repeals and preserves 
itself at the same moment (the dialectics of this development can be best described by the 
Hegelian term of “aufhebend”). 
(iv) Corrective taxes in the context of the legal techniques of social control 
The legal regulation on the taxation of the fi nancial sector is a subject that can be put in a 
broader context at least in two respects. First, it is worth studying it as the taxation of 
fi nancial instruments that can be compared to corporate taxation, VAT and payroll (labour 
income) taxation. The tax treatment of fi nancial instruments can be examined with particular 
regard to transaction taxes, in particular, to securities transaction taxes. The benefi t of the 
comprehensive discussion of the fi nancial sector taxation would be that the taxation of the 
fi nancial sector could be compared to that of the non-fi nancial sector.11 Second, tax measures 
that are applicable to the fi nancial sector can be considered as corrective taxes that can be 
11 Review of current practices for taxation of fi nancial instruments, profi ts and remuneration of 
the fi nancial sector, PwC TAXUD Working Paper No.31, Brussels, 6 June 2012. 
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compared to the other crisis related means of legal regulation, in particular to civil liability, 
administrative law and criminal law sanctions.12 
The corrective nature of the tax related tools of legal regulation can be compared to 
normal taxes that are not entrusted with functions of other than raising funds. For many 
years, corrective taxes were applied quite narrowly. For instance, they can be applied to 
polluting activities. Another example for their application is the use of excise duties that are 
designed not only to raise funds, but also to infl uence undesirable consumer habits. It is 
new that they are being proliferated in the banking sector.13 It is easier to design corrective 
taxes than apply regulations insofar as it is less required for application to know. Namely, it 
is enough to be informed of the estimated harms of the activity to be addressed that must be 
eliminated, not to mention the probable benefi ts.14 The present paper focuses on the taxes 
applicable to the fi nancial sector (operating mainly as fi nancial stability contributions or 
bank levies). Non-tax regulatory tools are thus not dealt with below unless they are closely 
connected with tax related measures, the function of which cannot be explored without 
reference to non-tax law measures. 
It is an easy approach to the problem of regulatory design that may react to the 
fi nancial crisis that legislative responses are to be substantiated by reference to the 
effectiveness and economic effi ciency of the legal regulation. From this angle, the cost & 
benefi t method can be highlighted, according to which the various means of legal regulation 
can be evaluated.15 One must be aware of the limits on the application of this method of 
evaluation, however. The performance of legal institutions can be measured by means of 
economic effi ciency, of course. This is the responsibility of a doctrine of law & economics. 
The global fi nancial crisis has manifested, however, in market imperfections. Thereafter, 
one must be cautious, or rather critical, about the methods that are based on the assumption 
of economic effi ciency. 
The quality of legal regulation can be assessed from the viewpoints of various legal 
techniques. One can learn in this respect from Robert Summers who has explored the legal 
nature of the various techniques of social control (i.e. remedial, penal, administrative, 
public benefi t oriented, and private arrangements related techniques can be enumerated).16 
Being loyal to the comprehensive approach to law of Summers, the observer must arrive in 
the end of a process of the evaluation of legal tools at the justifi cation by integrity of law. 
Due to market imperfections, business considerations must be critically examined 
from the viewpoint of macroeconomics. A legal analysis should suggest more than simply 
refl ect business considerations. It should assist market participants and, in particular, those 
who benefi t from market services in learning from the critics by macroeconomics of the 
global fi nancial crisis. Having encountered the post-crisis developments, the lawyer should 
seek to fi nd solutions while designing legal tools in an environment where the basic legal 
12 Hellgardt, A.: Comparing apples and oranges? Public, private, tax and criminal law in 
fi nancial markets regulation. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working Paper, 
No. 2012-04, Munich, June 2012. 
13 Corrective tax is a means of regulation that is connected to the estimated harm rather than to 
the harm actually done. See Shavell, S.: The optimal structure of law enforcement. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 36 (April 1993) 1, Part 2, 284. 
14 Shavell: op. cit. 285. 
15 Hellgardt: op. cit. 3. 
16 Summers, R. S.: The technique element in law; A tribute to Hans Kelsen. California Law 
Review, 59 (1971), 745. 
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principles like the rule of law and the equality before the law are faded during the permanent 
adjustments to be made to the abrupt changes arising from externalities. 
With the emphasis placed on economic effi ciency and on the application of the cost & 
benefi t method, the option of civil liability is obviously preferred to penal sanctions, 
administrative regulations or corrective taxes. This may still be problematic fi rst because it 
relies on the assumption of market perfection, whether it is true or not. Second, other 
options that could arise from the logic of discourse and cooperation between market 
participants are not revealed. 
The parties affected by legal regulation should seek for an elbow room where a 
common language can be developed, through which the values can be acknowledged that 
could be guiding in a particular case. Delegation of the regulatory power to Community 
bodies can also be helpful.  Even Community law is, however, in a need of the fringe means 
of control, like blanket law and comitology. The market players themselves should be 
responsible for creating an atmosphere, in which agreements can be reached from case to 
case. 
While analysing the operation of fi nancial markets, the examples of false investment 
advice, insider trading and the disregard by bank managers of moral hazard do not really 
seem to be able to explore the problem of fi nancial markets that–as a result of refl exivity, 
virtualisation and self-generation as explained by George Soros–contribute to the volatility 
of the pricing of both fi nancial products and fundamentals, lack transparency and reduce 
liquidity, respectively. The appearance of the new generations of securities without being 
supported by fresh capital and the autopoietic nature of the expansion of fi nancial markets 
are not problems that would have been generated by the malpractice of bank managers 
through misinformation, insider trading or the negligent treatment of moral hazard. It is not 
the fault of the service-providers themselves, but it is due to the operation of the whole 
system of fi nancial markets that service-providers are easily able to enter a new segment of 
deals, but can hardly able to exit. 
The option of civil liability as a regulatory tool can be associated with the legal 
technique of private arrangements as interpreted by Summers. The great benefi t of such a 
technique is the facilitation of contracting parties with a number of legally recognised 
options. In case of the enhanced application of directive rules, the role of judiciary is also 
conspicuous. It may then largely depend on the court seized in a particular case how the 
relevant law will be enforced. The civil liability-based method of legal regulation may thus 
give much fl exibility in the management of legal problems. 
It is the constraint on the use of this regulatory method, however, that it is bound to the 
equivalence with each other of the individual performance of one contracting party and the 
consideration made for it by the other party. Markets cease to operate unless the principle of 
“quid pro quo” is operatively maintained. Market players may fail to achieve this balance 
some times, however. This is not because their conduct is defective or morally objectionable. 
Failure may simply happen because markets should reach a level of development to fi nd 
solutions for the obligations developed before. Markets are not always complete, however. 
Reciprocity is superior to market-equilibrium in the instance that the performance made by 
one party to another one is not necessarily compensated to the fi rst party, but consideration 
may widely be made in favour of third parties. This makes the relationship of parties free 
from the opportunism of the market-oriented conduct. 
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2. Taxation of the fi nancial sector by means of Robin Hood taxes 
(i) Commercialisation of morality, populism and corporatism in taxation policy 
As long as systemic risks cannot be securely maintained within the fi nancial sector since 
the start of the global fi nancial crisis, the interference of the public authorities with the 
operation of fi nancial intermediaries seems to be inevitable. In line with the application of 
fi nancial regulations, it seems also to be necessary to involve in the regulatory armoury the 
tax related tools of regulation. This suggests the introduction of corrective taxes. They can, 
however, be seen from an angle of criticism as well. 
This criticism can be exercised not only on the ground that the economic criticism of 
the fi nancial sector’s  performance is not fully suffi cient, and that interference with the free 
market oriented operation of fi nancial enterprises is arbitrary, and therefore unnecessary. 
Such a criticism can also be justifi ed from the viewpoint that corrective taxes do not provide 
a solution that would be appropriate for crisis management. Instead, the corrective taxes of 
the fi nancial sector could be depicted as the deterioration of the standard arsenal of tax 
policy. They should in this respect represent the commercialisation of morality. It is thus 
false morality, under which special taxes of the fi nancial sector could be introduced. Hence, 
they might be not only ineffi cient and dysfunctional from an economic point of view, but 
they may also be immoral. 
At the time of crisis, ideas and simple views may be capriciously raised to the level of 
ethical norms, and even legal provisions. Then the product of legislation could be assessed 
directly from a moral point of view. Such moral considerations may then replace the 
professional standards of systematic fi scal policy and legal doctrines. In such a case, 
morality will be confused with the dogmatics of law. Such an approach to law opens a door 
to the so-called Robin Hood taxes.17 
From the viewpoint of Robin Hood style fi scal policy, taxes should not affect the 
ordinary people. They should instead be targeted at the rich. Although the taxation of the 
fi nancial sector seems to avoid the ordinary people and addressed to the rich, this is not 
quite true. As the smooth operation of fi nancial institutions is in the very interest of the 
public, failure to operate would directly hit the ordinary people. The burden of this failure 
must then be borne by the ordinary people. This way, a Robin Hood tax sounds well, but it 
is far from the quality of a systematic tax and legal policy. 
Clearly, particular tax policies cannot really be justifi ed by commercialised versions of 
ethical standards. It is also a question, however, if it is possible at all to raise ethical issues, 
while arriving at the assessment of tax policies. Truly, it is hardly possible directly to apply 
ethical judgments, while evaluating tax policies. This is because there is no public 
agreement what about good taxes are, or what is about the just behaviour a taxpayer has to 
pursue. Ethical considerations must be integrated into the professional standards. It is 
precluded that, e.g. a fi scal policy could be considered as ethical if it is failed from a 
professional point of view. However, as the global fi nancial crisis has shown us again, the 
free market conduct cannot survive without the assistance of public institutions and, from 
this perspective, ethical considerations cannot be missed. 
17 Beck, H.–Prinz, A.: Moralisierung in der Steuerpolitik: Was taugen die jüngsten 
Steuervorschläge? Wirtschaftsdienst, 90 (Dezember 2010) 12, 824. 
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The commercialisation of ethics can be expressed in the fi eld of politics as populism 
that can be described from the perspective of sociology by the following features:18 
– the language of political discourse is not syntagmatic, but paradigmatic; that is, it is 
evocative rather than systematic; 
– the public space organised by politics seems to be equivalent to particular political 
manifestations; and 
– as these political manifestations are able to independently constitute ideological 
contents, what is representing may be exaggerated, compared to what is represented. 
From the viewpoint of social psychology, populism can be characterised as follows:19 
– populism is the reverse side of the ascetic behaviour that dictates us renouncement 
from the consumption of the goods that can be adjudged as evil; abandonment takes place 
through penance, suffering is manifested as reasonable and the individual refraining himself 
or herself from action can be glorifi ed and spiritualised; 
– under populism, the individual is pathologically infl ated in a course of action where 
the empty space left due to the disrespect of professional values is to be replaced by 
authority, or even force; 
– repression is proliferated, producing waste, the removal of which is only possible by 
the assumption of confl icts (in particular, by showing up scapegoats and fabricating 
conspiracies); and 
– in the circumstances of populism, there is no more space for ethical considerations, 
morality can be replaced by Darwinism, and legal regulation by voluntarism. 
The fi scal policy that is manifested in Robin Hood taxes is a kind of populism. In such 
a case, the legislator does not invest in legislation much preparatory work. This policy is 
rather of improvisational nature. The legislator negotiates particular political manifestations, 
while seeking to keep aside the ordinary people from the impact of taxation, and focusing 
on the rich, such as bankers and their institutions. While designing such taxes, professional 
standards may be replaced by voluntarist measures of fi scal policy. 
Upon designing a Robin Hood tax, the ability-to-pay principle is complemented by the 
corporatism related idea that large organisations have their particular responsibility for 
fi nancing public tasks. In particular, fi nancial enterprises may be expected to contribute to 
the cost of their bail out to be fi nanced by public funds. Financial service-providers may be 
bound to this responsibility even if they sustain losses. In this respect, it seems to be 
justifi able to levy on them taxes simply because these organisations are big enough. The 
size of organisation can thus be more important than the way, in which market-players 
operate. Robin Hood taxes are typically levied on companies operating in network 
industries. They appear not only in the fi nancial sector, but also in the fi eld of 
telecommunication or of the supply of energy. Other large organisations can also be 
involved, like pharmaceuticals.20 
18 Laclau, E.: Populism: What’s in a name? University of Essex, Centre for Theoretical Studies 
in the Humanities and Social Sciences; Online papers, Colchester, 2005. 
19 Neumann, E.: Tiefenpsychologie und neue Ethik. Opus Magnum 2005, www.opus-magnum.
de; Erstmals erschienen Zürich: Rascher, 1949, Paras 68, 78, 120, 122. 
20 All these Robin Hood taxes can be found in Hungary. 
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The state introducing Robin Hood taxes is willing to offer an alliance with the ordinary 
people (like the case was with “Forza Italia”). Such a state identifi es itself as the guardian 
of the interests of the ordinary people. This alliance can only be interpreted in the political 
sphere, however, where professional values of a fi scal policy are usually subdued by 
political considerations. The policy of Robin Hood taxes can be justifi ed by the criticism of 
the post-industrial mass society, representative democracy, and even of the idea of free 
competition. In this context, economic rationality must be reinterpreted. Public bodies 
should not be subordinated to the interests of free trade and fi scal discipline. Instead, they 
should be responsible for negotiating between the households of the public and private 
sectors. The large volume of tangible and intangible assets representing signifi cant volume 
of knowledge can only be produced, and reproduced, if public bodies are involved in the 
process of socially organised production and distribution. The cost that must be paid for this 
is to levy special taxes, the rationale of which clearly deviates from the idea of fi scal 
neutrality. 
(ii) Emerging constraints on legislation during the fi nancial crisis 
Robin Hood taxes are not only the product of the fi nancial crisis, but also that of the 
legislation based on the above depicted commercialised morality that may prevail over the 
professional considerations of fi scal neutrality and legal certainty. There should still be 
constraints on the legal regulation that is either subdued by ideological and political 
considerations that debilitate the rule of law principle, or positive law can be dissolved in 
the values of natural and customary law, and social players are not provided by the state 
with comprehensive statutory law. 
Constraints on the legal regulation can also be ascertained in another aspect of the 
mechanics of law, i.e. regarding “lex” and “ius”. It is thus a question how much law can be 
enforced.21 This is a problem that has been acute in cases where the legislator does not have 
suffi cient knowledge on the subject of legislation. It is in particular true in case of the new 
taxes of the fi nancial sector that the legislator is not provided with the ability of omniscience. 
He or she is thus not able to predict events at the level of exactness that would be necessary 
to legislate in a proper manner. It can then occur that, at a certain point, law cannot be 
enforced. This way, law (lex) does not provide longer a basis for the exercise of subjective 
rights (ius). 
The scope of legal regulation and moral conventions are eventually constrained both 
bottom up and top down. The bottom up borderline comes from the insuffi ciencies of a 
mass society. Masses can be easily infl uenced, and even manipulated. As observed by the 
psychologist, people may easily become in a crowd irresponsible. They can be pathologically 
subordinated to their leaders, and lose their sensibility to innovations. They can in a crowd 
be similar to the individual who is hypnotised or neurotic. They can feel to be in a fl ock of 
sheep where they lose their judgment and morality.22 The products of commercialised 
morality, resulting in Robin Hood taxes are adjusted to the sentiments and attitudes of such 
behaviour. From this perspective, Robin Hood taxes tend to suggest the end of law and 
morality. 
21 See more for that in Deak, D.: Neutrality and legal certainty in tax law and the effective 
protection of taxpayers’ rights. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 49 (2008) 2, 178–180. 
22 Freud, S.: Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse. Wien, 1921, 16, 18, 21, 23. 
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Legal application can also be constrained top down.  In certain conditions, people do 
not feel it necessary to rely on the conventions of this world. This is because they realise 
that both moral and legal norms lack absolute values. Due to this, the abuse of law cannot 
be stopped.  Experiencing these insuffi ciencies, people are willing to substitute divine laws 
for the regulations of the secular world. This is a sphere of life where it is not necessary 
longer to rely on legal sanctions irrespective of whether moral and legal rules are supported 
by the morality that is deteriorated or not. It is not the responsibility of the lawyer to deal 
with these value judgments. They are still indispensable because moral conventions and 
legal rules are complemented by transcendental values that can only be found in this higher 
sphere of regulation. Bargaining is vital in a market economy-based society. However, 
neither equilibrium of individual expectations, nor balance of legal application can be 
reached without the consensus on noumenal values. 
Tax liability must be established on statutory law, which is in the hard core of legal 
regulation. Tax law is designed to achieve fi scal neutrality. The more freedom from the 
fl uctuations of daily politics the tax legislator enjoys, the better chances are for the adoption 
of tax law of good quality. The introduction of Robin Hood taxes, being as sectoral ones, 
clearly challenges fi scal neutrality. Concerns of horizontal equity can thus be signifi cant. 
Commercialisation of law contributes to the dilution of legislative techniques and 
standards, enhancing the disintegration of the tax law infrastructure. Where legal stability is 
missing, effectiveness in the protection of taxpayers, easy compliance and feasibility can 
also become doubtful. Legal application is centred on the issues of easy compliance and the 
effectiveness in the legal protection of taxpayers. Adjustment of the legislator to abrupt 
changes may reach an instance where not only “ex ante”, but also “ex post” measures (e.g. 
claw back measures) may apply. This is to debilitate legality not only in following tax laws, 
but also in the fi eld of tax legislation. 
3. Regulatory options and framework 
(i) Regulatory options 
The basic pattern of a bank leverage tax is the fi nancial stability contribution (“FSC”) as 
proposed by the IMF.23 It is a special charge that could be introduced to contribute to the 
stabilisation of the fi nancial market. It is different from the fi nancial crisis responsibility fee 
(“FCRF”) as proposed by the US President Obama.24  The latter is, although to be levied 
“ex ante”, serves like an insurance fee. A claw back measure is based on the Dodd-Frank 
Bill of 22 July 2010.25 According to it, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
shall charge one or more risk-based assessments if such assessments are necessary to pay in 
full the obligations issued by the FDIC to the Secretary within 60 months of the date of 
issuance of such obligations. 
It can be compared to a legal institution called in the practice of German-language 
countries as “Umlage”. The point to the latter is that the burden arising from certain 
23 A fair and substantial contribution by the fi nancial sector, IMF fi nal report for the G-20, June 
2010. 
24 The White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary, January 14, 2010. 
25 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203 (H.R. 
4173), 124 Stat. 1376. 
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externalities must be allocated to the participants affected by the risks. An example for this 
is the cost of sick payment or maternity leave to be shared between the state, the employer 
and the employee. Another example for such cost-sharing is the cost of the facilities of 
green energy to be shared between the public and those individuals who benefi t from these 
facilities. The cost of car insurance can also be mentioned that can be shared between the 
public and car users. 
A Commission Communication on fi nancial sector taxation is also noteworthy.26 It 
envisages the options of a fi nancial transaction tax (“FTT”) and a fi nancial activity tax 
(“FAT”).  FTT is not to be charged on fi nancial institutions, but on specifi c transactions. 
FTT is to be discussed, based on a proposed EC directive,27 not being subject of this paper. 
In contrast, FAT is to be levied on the particular items of the value added produced by 
banks, that is, on banking profi t and bankers remuneration. While referring to bonuses, it 
may function as a surcharge. 
Bank leverage tax has been introduced at a national level in a number of the EU 
Member States. It can be seen from comparative data that the tax rates applied in Hungary 
are extremely high. It is also noteworthy that it is only Germany and Sweden where the 
levy is dedicated to a special stability fund. In that respect, the bank levies introduced in 
other countries seem to be less justifi ed. 
Hungary is also unique in the sense that the Hungarian crisis tax is introduced 
temporarily only, that is, for the period of 2010–12. This tax was introduced in the autumns 
of 2010 retroactively as applicable as of 1 January 2010. The burden of tax should be 
reduced by 50% for 2012 as a result of an agreement the Hungarian Government concluded 
with the Hungarian Bankers Association.28 From 2013, this tax should be replaced by a 
permanent fi nancial transaction tax, not discussed here. Notably, it cannot be compared to 
the Commission-based FTT proposal.29 
The bank levy issue is to be studied in the context of other taxes like corporate income 
tax and local taxes. Securities transaction taxes are also noteworthy. The right to elect for 
VAT, payroll taxes and insurance premium taxes if any are also important while making an 
assessment of the taxation of the fi nancial sector. 
(ii) Regulatory framework 
The major aspects of the assessment of a regulatory framework relevant to the special 
taxation of fi nancial markets can be highlighted as follows: 
– “ex ante” versus “ex post” measures; 
– destination of proceeds; 
– personal scope of taxation; 
26 COM(2010) 549 fi nal. 
27 Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of fi nancial transaction tax and 
amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM(2011) 594 fi nal. The Commission submitted a new proposal 
under No. COM(2013) 71 fi nal on 14 February 2013, now based on the enhanced cooperation in the 
area of fi nancial transaction tax that is to be introduced in eleven Member States. 
28 Understanding between the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Bankers’ Association 
of 15 December 2011. 
29 For the analysis of the current crisis tax of fi nancial enterprises and the fi nancial transactions 
tax, the law on which has been passed, but will be applicable from the next year no, see Deak, D.: 
Bizarr magyar pénzügyi adók (Bizarre Hungarian fi nancial taxes). Figyelő, (2012) 31, 54–55. 
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– taxable basis; 
– tax rates; 
– possible prohibition of deduction for corporate tax purposes; and 
– double charging. 
While designing a regulatory framework, the fi rst question to be answered is whether 
and if so, how to apply “ex ante” measures. This is a major challenge for tax policy 
designers because the normal approach would be to stick to the legal certainty principle as 
introduced already by Adam Smith. In this context, “ex post” measures, lacking a normative 
basis should be excluded. Meeting the global fi nancial crisis, it seems to be utmost diffi cult 
to predict the future, however. Therefore, legislators would like to reserve themselves to be 
fl exible. Even if “ex ante” measures are applied, they are combined with “ex post” ones. 
For example, the French regulatory supervision authority may modify the minimum 
regulatory capital rules within three years after the payment of the bank levy regarding a 
given tax year. Then, the bank levy for such a tax year can be retroactively increased or 
decreased accordingly. By this feature of fl exibility, it can also be pointed out that tax law is 
closely connected with non-tax regulations. Tax and non-tax tools of regulation are aimed at 
the same subject, that is, at the formation of the own capital for capital adequacy purposes, 
and they have been introduced with the same purpose, that is, with that of protecting the 
own capital of fi nancial enterprises, comparable to the total risk-weighted assets. The 
French tax is levied on the risk-weighted assets that are taken into account with calculating 
the own capital for the purposes of capital adequacy standards. In Germany, additional 
contributions can be requested from credit institutions where the resources of the 
restructuring fund that is fi nanced by the bank levy prove to be insuffi cient to cover the 
measures, proposed to be taken to stabilise the fi nancial sector. Tax measures can be 
considered as the indirect means of control, as compared to the direct means of regulation 
of the own capital for capital adequacy purposes in the sense that while the latter cannot be 
shunned unless a portion of bank assets is eventually withdrawn, the payment of the bank 
levy can be avoided, provided that the taxpayer is not engaged in certain taxable events. 
The “ex post” means of regulation are claw back measures. This way, the fi nancial 
service-providers are requested to reimburse the state for the cost of stabilising the fi nancial 
market. The liability to pay is thus developed subsequent to the taxable event. This also 
means that the burden of payment cannot be predicted. Sticking to the requirement that the 
introduction of tax liability must be based on legal provisions that provide for the liability 
to pay tax in advance, claw back measures cannot be considered longer as taxes. 
Another constraint on the applicability of taxation is a fi nancial crisis responsibility fee 
as known by a proposal of President Obama. The fee is directly compensated by the 
stabilisation measures to be taken if necessary. It is an “ex ante” measure. It can be 
considered, as discussed, as an insurance fee rather than a tax, however. Notably, the burden 
of fee can, and would likely, be passed over to the taxpayer’s clients. 
It can be seen from the destination of the proceeds to be collected that the function of 
raising money is associated with the goal of exercising infl uence on the taxpayer’s conduct. 
This means that the tax revenue can fall once the legislative measure reaches its goal, that 
is, to discourage the participants of the fi nancial market from getting engaged in excessive 
fi nancial activity. This is not yet a problem because the major goal is to address externalities, 
that is, to manage systemic risks connected with the fi nancial activity. 
A bank tax, the revenue of which fl ows to the general state budget cannot be strictly 
considered as a bank leverage tax, or a bank levy. This is the case with the Hungarian crisis 
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tax of fi nancial enterprises, not being targeted at the stabilisation of fi nancial intermediaries. 
In fact, there was no Hungarian fi nancial institution that would have been subject to any 
recovery measure taken by the state. The Hungarian tax has been introduced to stabilise the 
state budget. The main goal is to manage the public debt that tended to be around about 
80% of the annual GDP in the recent four or fi ve years. The Hungarian tax is thus not a tax 
of the crisis of banks, but of the crisis of the state budget. 
While designing the personal scope of taxation, it is important to remember the danger 
of relocation. This is in particular an issue with transaction taxes, but bank levies or a 
fi nancial activity tax can also be affected. Relocation is a variant of deadweight losses. 
Thus, the addressee of a tax law may elude taxation by ceasing to act or leaving for a 
territory, which is outside the scope of taxation.30  Relocation is also problematic because 
the fi nancial institutions that are not big and mobile enough would not be able to move. As 
a consequence, the fi nancial institutions that represent the moral hazard of “too big to fail” 
would escape tax, but the fi nancial institutions that do not signify such a danger would be 
hit by it.31 
Designing the scope of a bank leverage tax, it can be logical to exclude from taxation 
inter-banking business, on the one hand. It is also a matter of choice if taxation be extended 
not only to deposit institutions, but to the enterprises of investment banking as well. On the 
other hand, it seems to be reasonable to treat fi nancial enterprises as taxpayers on a 
consolidated basis. It may depend on the jurisdiction how this idea is to be implemented. 
For example, in the UK, it is obvious that large companies are treated as groups for civil 
law, accounting and tax purposes. On the European continent, this is not so much evident, 
however. For instance, in France, the bank leverage tax is levied on a consolidated basis, 
provided, however, that the head of group is established in France. In case of the UK levy, 
there is no such requirement. In Germany, the bank levy (Bankenabgabe) is levied on single 
entities. 
Commercial reality dictates us that groups should be subject to a bank levy rather than 
single entities. For the tax lawyer it may cause a problem, however, because it may be 
diffi cult to treat commercial entities (groups) that are not single legal entities, or they are, 
but in certain conditions only. For example, the mechanics of a double tax convention is 
normally designed to treat single taxpayers. While the tax liability of affi liated entities is 
calculable, it can be extremely diffi cult if not impossible to apply the rules of allocating the 
taxation power of two or more states. Although a tax treaty may provide for indirect credit, 
the personal scope of treaty and the notion of fi scal residence must be determined in case of 
single entities. Where the personal scope of taxation is directly extended to groups, 
overlapping of the taxation power of more than one state cannot be avoided. 
A bank leverage tax can be levied on the balance sheet total assets, on the balance 
sheet total liabilities, on the turnover (sales receipts), on profi t, or on any other form of the 
value added produced, e.g. on the bonuses paid to bank managers. Notably, it cannot be 
levied on single transactions. It would already be a fi nancial transaction tax, not subject of 
this paper. Nevertheless, the rationale for a fi nancial transaction tax is the same, that is, to 
30 Page, R. T.: Foolish Revenge or Shrewd Regulation? Financial-Industry Tax Law Reforms 
Proposed in the Wake of the Financial Crisis. Tulane Law Review, 85 (2010–2011), 200. 
31 Beck, H.–Prinz, A.: Moralisierung in der Steuerpolitik: Was taugen die jüngsten 
Steuervorschläge? op. cit. 822. 
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address systemic risks by deterring fi nancial intermediaries from getting engaged in any 
excessive fi nancial activity. 
A transaction tax seems to be more appropriate for sorting out risks that are associated 
with the various types of transactions (e.g. those with derivatives). It is then easier to pass 
over the burden of tax. A bank leverage tax is a tax of the fi nancial service-provider itself, 
and it is not clear if the burden of tax can be passed over. Where it is levied on risk-weighted 
assets, its connectedness with banking regulations is apparent. Where tax is levied on 
liabilities, it is designed to adjust the taxpayer’s status of indebtedness. A turnover-based 
tax seems to be less viable for the purposes of a bank leverage tax. This is because the 
identifi cation of the systemic risks is not really connected with the development of the 
turnover. The Hungarian crisis tax of fi nancial enterprises is levied on the turnover in case 
of the fi nancial enterprises other than credit institutions. This can be explained by the fact 
that the Hungarian tax is not a bank leverage tax. 
Taking into account the goal to be associated with the introduction of a bank leverage 
tax, that is, to address externalities, it seems to be logical to apply progressive rates and 
caps. The main idea is to fi lter out risks. Therefore, innocent activities (long-term deposits, 
claims instituted against the public, etc.) can be excluded, or be subject to lower taxation. 
The harshness of taxation can be alleviated in case of large-volume transactions by applying 
caps or ceilings. Otherwise taxation would cause unnecessary restrictions on the free 
movement of capital. Was this the case, it could hardly be possible to justify the restrictive 
tax measure, considering the proportionality principle. Transactions with fi nancial 
derivatives should be subject to lower rates as they produce a large volume, and higher-rate 
taxation would deteriorate this business what cannot be the legislator’s goal. Progression in 
taxation makes nevertheless a signal to taxpayers of how they orient themselves. They are 
thus recommended to avoid getting engaged in excessive fi nancial activity. 
One can argue that the burden of a bank leverage tax should be treated as an expense 
for corporate tax purposes. This is not the case in certain jurisdictions (e.g. in Germany), 
however. The tax would seem unjust in particular in cases where the taxpayer sustains 
losses. The Hungarian tax is extremely comprehensive because the crisis tax of fi nancial 
enterprises is combined with a crisis tax of credit institutions. The latter is levied on profi t 
at a 30% rate. The former can be reduced by the profi t-based tax, if any. Where there is no 
basis for profi t tax, it is the total balance sheet assets related tax of fi nancial enterprises that 
is applicable at a standard rate of 0.53% with credit institutions. The crisis tax of fi nancial 
enterprises can be deducted from the corporate tax base. 
While the taxation of the fi nancial sector is designed during the global fi nancial crisis, 
it is important not only to make an assessment whether the fi nancial industry is overtaxed. 
Similarly, it is also vital to take into account that debt bias has contributed to the crisis. 
From this perspective, all the measures are welcome that may resolve the problem of 
asymmetry in the tax treatment of debt and equity. In this respect, one can mention about 
the following tools: thin capitalisation regimes, comprehensive business income tax rules 
with limited deduction opportunity (“CBIT”), and the allowance for corporate equity 
(“ACE”).  The expanded use of fair valuation rules may also help with this problem. 
However, they may also increase instability in the legal regulation, lacking a cash basis for 
accounting. 
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Besides, it is noteworthy that the extensive application of fi scal incentives can be 
prejudiced because they may well have contributed to deepening of the crisis. In this 
respect, the following can be highlighted:32 
– tax preferences applicable to capital income and the proliferation of employee stock 
option plans; 
– the preferential tax regimes that were applicable to housing; 
– tax planning opportunities relating to the products of structured fi nance; and 
– proliferation of tax havens and harmful tax competition. 
The problem of double charging arises from the overlapping of taxation that is based 
both on personal and territorial scope. While the foreign operating branches of domestic 
fi nancial enterprises are taxable according to the concept of worldwide taxation, the 
domestically operating branches of foreign enterprises are also taxable, now by means of 
the territorial scope of taxation. The problem of overlapping is exacerbated by the fact that 
the bank levy may be applicable to groups (like in the UK or France). This is why the UK 
has concluded double tax agreements on the relief from the double charging of bank levies 
with France and Germany. This is a topic that is to be discussed in a separate paper.
32 Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy; Prepared by the IMF 
Fiscal Affairs Department; Approved by Carlo Cottarelli; 12 June 2009, para. 21, p. 14, para. 29, p. 
16, para. 32, p. 17, para. 49, p. 24 para. 53, p. 25, para. 57, p. 26, para. 63, p. 28, para. 68, p. 30. 
